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Bipolar spectrum disorders (BSDs) are often characterized by cognitive inflexibility and affective 
extremities, including “extreme” or polarized thoughts and beliefs, which have been shown to 
predict a more severe course of illness. However, little research has evaluated factors that may be 
associated with extreme cognitions, such as personality disorders, which are often characterized 
by extreme, inflexible beliefs and also are associated with poor illness course in BSDs. The 
present study evaluated associations between BSDs, personality disorder characteristics, and 
extreme cognitions (polarized responses made on measures of attributional style and dysfunctional 
attitudes), as well as links between extreme cognitions and the occurrence of mood episodes, 
among euthymic young adults with BSDs (n = 83) and demographically-matched healthy controls 
(n = 89) followed prospectively for three years. The relationship between personality disorder 
characteristics and negative and positive extreme cognitions was stronger among BSD participants 
than among healthy controls, even after statistically accounting for general cognitive styles. 
Furthermore, extreme negative cognitions predicted the prospective onset of major depressive and 
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hypomanic episodes. These results suggest that extreme cognitive styles are most common in 
individuals with BSDs and personality disorder characteristics, and they provide further evidence 
that extreme negative cognitions may confer risk for mood dysregulation.
Keywords
Extreme attributions; attributional style; dysfunctional attitudes; cognitive style; personality 
disorders; bipolar disorder; extreme response style
“...Two extremes ought not to be practiced... there is addiction to indulgence of 
sense-pleasures... and there is addiction to self-mortification, which is painful, 
unworthy, and unprofitable... avoiding both these extremes [is] the middle path... 
[which] gives knowledge and lends to calm, to insight, to enlightenment.”
--Buddha (Buddhist Publication Society, 1999)
Bipolar disorder (BD) can be a severe mood disorder with a chronic course that is 
characterized by periods of mood elevation or irritability and depression (APA, 2013), as 
well as impairment in many areas of functioning (Angst et al., 2002; Goodwin & Jamison, 
2007; Grant et al., 2004; Judd & Akiskal, 2003; Judd et al., 2008). BDs form a spectrum of 
severity from the milder cyclothymic disorder to full-blown bipolar I disorder, and milder 
forms of bipolar spectrum disorders (BSDs) sometimes progress to more severe BSDs (e.g., 
Akiskal et al., 1977; Alloy et al., 2012; Birmaher et al., 2009). Many individuals with BSDs 
experience a course of illness that is highly recurrent with frequent mood episodes 
(Nierenberg et al., 2010; Perlis et al., 2006). Thus, identifying which individuals may 
experience a more severe course of illness potentially has major implications for improving 
interventions and public health care (Johnson & Meyer, 2005).
One characteristic that has been useful in identifying risk for poor illness course in BSDs is 
negative cognitive style (the tendency to attribute negative events to causes that are stable 
and global with negative consequences and self-implications) (for a review, see Alloy et al., 
2005). Existing prospective studies have demonstrated that in interaction with life events, 
both pessimistic and optimistic attributional styles predicted increases in hypomanic 
symptoms in individuals with BSDs, whereas only pessimistic attributional styles predicted 
increases in symptoms of depression (Alloy et al., 1999; Reilly-Harrington et al., 1999) and 
longer duration of depressive episodes in interaction with initial depression severity (Stange 
et al., 2013a).
Individuals with BSDs also have elevated levels of dysfunctional attitudes, or maladaptive 
beliefs about the self and the world (Alloy et al., 2005). In BSDs, dysfunctional attitudes 
also have predicted increases in symptoms of depression (Johnson & Fingerhut, 2004), and 
in interaction with life events they have predicted increases in manic symptoms (Reilly-
Harrington et al., 1999). Similarly, Francis-Raniere et al. (2006) found that in individuals 
with BSDs, dysfunctional attitudes about performance evaluation predicted increases in 
hypomanic and depressive symptoms following congruent stressors. However, not all 
studies of BSDs have found a prospective association between dysfunctional attitudes and 
Stange et al. Page 2






















illness course; for example, in one study, dysfunctional attitudes did not predict the 
prospective onset of episodes of depression or hypomania (Alloy et al., 2009).
Corroborating similar findings in individuals with major depressive disorder (Petersen et al., 
2007; Teasdale et al., 2001), recent work also has demonstrated that extreme attributions 
(extreme negative cognitive styles) about the causes of life events (e.g., “I lost my job 
because I am a complete failure as a person”) are associated with a more severe course of 
bipolar illness. Among depressed adults with bipolar I or II disorders, the tendency to make 
extreme attributions predicted a longer duration of episodes of depression, greater likelihood 
of a history of suicide attempts and of suicidal ideation among previous attempters, and a 
shorter time until the onset of episodes of mania, hypomania, or mixed episodes (Stange et 
al., 2013a,b, 2014). These results were consistent across extreme pessimistic and extreme 
optimistic attributions, suggesting that the tendency to make extreme attributions in general 
might be more important in understanding course of illness than the valence of the 
attributions themselves. These studies have been broadly consistent with theoretical work 
and empirical studies of BSDs that suggest that individuals with BSDs make extreme 
appraisals about the meaning of internal mood states (Jones et al., 2006; Kelly et al., 2011; 
Mansell et al., 2007, 2011), and that these appraisals are associated with increases in 
symptoms of mood elevation and depression (Dodd et al., 2011). Notably, although studies 
among samples with unipolar depression also have found that extreme dysfunctional 
attitudes predict a poorer course of depression (Beevers et al., 2003; Forand & DeRubeis, 
2014; Petersen et al., 2007; Teasdale et al., 2001), no study to date has evaluated this 
question in BSDs.
Given that extreme cognitions may be predictive of a worse course of illness in mood 
disorders, it is important to identify clinical characteristics associated with these cognitive 
tendencies in BSDs. One such set of characteristics that may be promising is personality 
disorders, which are frequently comorbid with BSDs (Fan & Hassell, 2008), and, like 
extreme cognitions, are also linked to a more severe course of BSDs (Bieling et al., 2003; 
Dunayevich et al., 2000; George et al., 2003). Personality disorders are characterized by 
extreme, inflexible behaviors and beliefs that are maintained across different contexts in 
which they may be maladaptive (APA, 2013; Beck et al., 2006). For example, individuals 
with borderline personality disorder engage in extreme dichotomous thinking styles when 
presented with emotionally-relevant stimuli (Arntz et al., 2011). However, although extreme 
cognitions are likely to be elevated in BSDs, it is unclear whether personality disorders 
contribute additional risk for having extreme cognitions; for example, it is unclear whether 
individuals with BSDs in conjunction with personality disorders are more likely to exhibit 
extreme cognitions relative to healthy controls. These questions are important given that 
extreme cognitions may be associated with a poorer course of illness in mood disorders.
In the present study, we sought to elucidate these questions by evaluating extreme 
cognitions, personality disorder characteristics, and course of illness in a prospective study 
of young adults with bipolar spectrum disorders (bipolar II, bipolar NOS, and cyclothymia) 
and matched controls. We hypothesized (1) that personality disorder characteristics would 
be associated with extreme cognitions more strongly among individuals with BSDs relative 
to healthy controls; and (2) that relative to individuals with less extreme cognitions, 
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individuals with more extreme cognitions would be more likely to experience the 
prospective onset of episodes of major depression and hypomania.
Method
Participants and Procedures
Participants in this study were drawn from the Temple University site of the Longitudinal 
Investigation of Bipolar Spectrum Disorders (LIBS) Project, which examined various factors 
that may influence the course of bipolar spectrum disorders. A two-phase screening process 
was used to select participants. In Phase I, approximately 7,500 university students 
completed the General Behavior Inventory (GBI; Depue et al., 1989). Based on the GBI 
cutoff criteria (see measures), 12.3% of the sample was eligible for the bipolar spectrum 
disorder (BSD) group, and 65% was potentially eligible for the control group. Up to four 
months after Phase I, 684 potentially eligible individuals completed a diagnostic interview 
for Phase II screening.
In Phase II, inclusion criteria for the BSD group were a lifetime diagnosis of bipolar II 
disorder, cyclothymia, or bipolar not otherwise specified (NOS), as determined by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV; APA, 1994) or 
Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC; Spitzer et al., 1978). The bipolar NOS group was 
comprised of individuals who had experienced three types of symptoms: (a) hypomanic 
episode(s) but no diagnosable depressive episodes, (b) a cyclothymic mood pattern with 
periods of affective disturbance that did not meet frequency/duration criteria for hypomanic 
and depressive episodes, or (c) hypomanic and depressive episodes not meeting frequency 
criteria for a diagnosis of cyclothymia.1 Participants were excluded from the BSD group if 
they experienced a manic episode as defined by the DSM-IV or RDC criteria, as this would 
indicate a bipolar I diagnosis (and an aim of the overall LIBS Project was to predict 
conversion to bipolar I). The control group had two exclusion criteria: (a) current or past 
diagnosis of any Axis I disorder, and (b) family history of a mood disorder.
The final sample consisted of a total of 172 participants (n = 83 BSD, n = 89 healthy; mean 
age = 19.79), with BSD participants matched with respect to gender, age, and ethnicity by 
the control group (see Table 1 for group comparisons). Of the BSD participants, 63% met 
criteria for bipolar II disorder, 25% met criteria for cyclothymia, and 12% met for bipolar 
NOS. Approximately 15% of the BSD sample had sought treatment (medication or 
psychotherapy) prior to the study, and 31% of the BSD sample sought treatment during the 
study (16% medication only, 13% psychotherapy only, and 3% were hospitalized) (Alloy et 
al., 2008).
Prior to entering the study, all participants provided written informed consent. The study 
was IRB approved by Temple University. At a Time 1 visit following the Phases I and II 
screening, participants completed self-report measures of negative cognitive style, 
dysfunctional attitudes, and symptoms of depression and hypomania. They also completed 
1These criteria for bipolar NOS are relevant to the DSM-5 criteria for other specified bipolar and related disorders, which allow for a 
diagnosis of a bipolar disorder in individuals who otherwise meet criteria for hypomania except for the duration criterion or the 
number of symptoms required.
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an interview assessing personality disorder characteristics. Participants completed diagnostic 
interviews assessing DSM-IV episodes of major depression and (hypo)mania every four 
months after the Time 1 visit for an average of three years of follow-up (M = 1067 days; SD 
= 472 days).
Interviews to assess diagnoses, mood episodes, and personality disorder characteristics were 
completed by intensively-trained doctoral students in clinical psychology and post-
baccalaureate research assistants, all of whom were supervised by a clinical psychologist 
with extensive experience in diagnosing mood disorders, as well as by a masters level 
director of diagnostic training (Alloy et al., 2008). Training consisted of an extensive series 
of lectures, observations of trained interviewers, practice diagnostic interviews, and live-
supervised interviews prior to interviewers completing interviews with participants by 
themselves. Diagnostic interviews were audiotaped to obtain consensus diagnoses and to 
assess inter-rater reliability. Two independent assessors computed inter-rater reliability by 
re-rating interviews for diagnoses and personality disorder characteristics. An expert M.D. 
psychiatric diagnostic consultant served as the third diagnostic tier, reviewing all diagnostic 
interviews with the clinical psychologist and coming to a consensus diagnosis in cases of 
initial disagreement.
Measures
General Behavior Inventory—The GBI (Depue et al., 1989) is a self-report 
questionnaire used during the Phase I screening process to identify and distinguish between 
potential bipolar spectrum participants and healthy controls. The GBI has been shown to be 
valid among a wide range of populations, including undergraduates, psychiatric outpatients, 
and relatives of bipolar I probands (Depue et al, 1989; Klein et al., 1985). Psychometric 
properties of the instrument are strong, with a reported internal consistency of αs= 
0.90-0.96, retest reliability of rs= 0.71-0.74, good sensitivity (0.78), and excellent specificity 
(0.99) for bipolar spectrum disorders (Depue et al., 1981, 1989). Each item is designed to 
assess various experiences related to depressive, (hypo)manic, or biphasic symptoms, and 
how said experiences range on the dimensions of intensity, duration, and frequency. The 
respondent provides a rating on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very 
often or almost constantly). Consistent with scoring by Depue and colleagues (1989), an 
item received one point when rated as 3 (often) or 4 (very often or almost constantly) on the 
scale. Points were then summed to obtain two subscores: depression (GBI-D score) and 
(hypo)mania and biphasic (GBI-HB score). Based on Depue et al.'s (1989) findings, the 
following cutoff scores were used to identify potential bipolar spectrum and control 
participants: GBI-D scores ≥ 11 and GBI-HB scores ≥ 13 for potential bipolar spectrum 
participants, and GBI-D scores < 11 and GBI-HB scores < 13 for normal controls. A pilot 
study for the LIBS project validated this high-GBI and low-GBI group assignment 
procedure against diagnoses obtained via Schedule for Affective Disorders and 
Schizophrenia interviews (see Alloy et al., 2008).
Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia – Lifetime version—
(SADS-L; Endicott & Spitzer, 1978). During Phase II of the screening process, 
semistructured diagnostic interviews were conducted using an expanded version of the 
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SADS-L (exp-SADS-L; Alloy et al., 2008, 2012), which assesses symptoms related to 
mood, anxiety, eating, psychotic, and substance use disorders over the lifetime. The exp-
SADS-L was expanded from the original SADS-L by our group to include additional probes 
to allow for DSM-IV and RDC to be assessed (Alloy et al., 2008, 2012), including increasing 
the number of items in the depression, mania/hypomania, and cyclothymia sections, and 
expansion of information obtained in terms of the timing of symptoms and episodes. Inter-
rater reliability was high: kappas for major depressive disorder diagnoses based on 80 jointly 
rated interviews were κ = .95, and bipolar spectrum diagnoses based on 105 jointly rated 
interviews yielded κ = .96 (Alloy et al., 2008).
International Personality Disorder Examination for DSM-IV—(IPDE; Loranger, 
1996). The IPDE is a semistructured interview that assesses dimensions of DSM-IV 
personality pathology. Trained interviewers were required to rate items based on 
participants’ verbal responses and observable behaviors during the interview's 
administration. Each DSM-IV personality disorder diagnosis is represented by a multitude of 
items. Dimensional scores for each disorder, and characteristics across all personality 
disorders (IPDE sum score), are computed by adding the individual items for that domain to 
calculate severity (Loranger, 1996; Pilkonis et al., 1991). The IPDE yields continuous scores 
of severity for each of the 10 DSM-IV personality disorder diagnoses, as well as a total score 
representing total personality disorder pathology. In the current study, our primary measure 
was the IPDE total score, with post-hoc analyses conducted using individual personality 
disorder dimension scores. The IPDE has demonstrated excellent inter-rater reliability, with 
κs = .79- .84 (Pilkonis et al., 1991), and good dimensional score consistency with the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R Personality Disorders (Spitzer et al., 1987). In 
the present sample, with the exception of schizotypal personality (κ = .46), the IPDE had 
acceptable inter-rater reliability based on 40 interview re-ratings (23% of interviews), with 
κs = .69 - .88 (Cogswell & Alloy, 2006).
Cognitive Style Questionnaire—The Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ; Alloy et al., 
2000; Haeffel et al., 2008) was used to assess participants' attributional styles for positive 
and negative events. The CSQ is a well-established instrument with good reliability and 
validity (Haeffel et al., 2008) that assesses attributions about the causes, consequences, and 
self-implications for hypothetical positive and negative events on four dimensions relevant 
to the hopelessness theory of depression: stability (“will never again cause [the event]” to 
“will also cause [the event] in the future”), globality (“will only cause problems with [the 
event]” to “will cause problems in all areas of my life”), consequences (“nothing bad will 
happen” to “very bad things will happen”), and self-implications (“doesn't mean anything is 
wrong with me” to “definitely means something is wrong with me”). The CSQ contains 12 
positive and 12 negative events and requires participants to rate each event on each of the 
four dimensions on 7-point Likert scales. The CSQ yields a total score, with higher scores 
indicating more negative cognitive style; possible range is −6 to +6 (observed range: 
−4.46-3.00). Consistent with previous studies (Petersen et al., 2007; Stange et al., 2013a,b, 
2014; Teasdale et al., 2001), we also computed the number of “extreme” attributions (rating 
of a 1 or 7) made on each attributional domain for each event, resulting in variables for 
extreme pessimistic attributions (number of ratings of “7” for negative events and ratings of 
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“1” for positive events; possible range is 0-96, observed range was 0-62), and extreme 
optimistic attributions (number of ratings of “1” for negative events and ratings of “7” for 
positive events; possible range is 0-96, observed range was 0-78). Internal consistency of the 
CSQ was excellent (α = .94). Although retest reliability of extreme responses on the CSQ 
has not been established, predictive validity on similar measures of attributional style has 
been established; extreme attributions predicted poorer course of illness in depression 
(Petersen et al., 2007; Teasdale et al., 2001) and bipolar disorder (Stange et al., 2013a,b).
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale.—The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman & 
Beck, 1978) is a 40-item self-report questionnaire that assesses dysfunctional, maladaptive 
beliefs about one's self-worth and the future. Using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
‘Totally agree’ to ‘Totally disagree’, participants are asked to respond to descriptions of 
their attitudes most of the time (e.g., “If I do not do as well as other people, it means I am an 
inferior human being”). The DAS yields a total score representing total dysfunctional 
attitudes (possible range is 40-280; observed range was 55-232). We also computed the 
number of “extreme” dysfunctional attitudes (number of items coded “1” or “7”) yielding 
variables for extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes (“1” on negatively valenced items; 
“7” on positively valenced items; possible range is 0-40, observed range was 0-26) and 
extreme positive dysfunctional attitudes (“7” on negatively valenced items; “1” on positively 
valenced items; possible range is 0-40, observed range was 0-32), consistent with previous 
studies of unipolar depression (Beevers et al., 2003; Petersen et al., 2007; Teasdale et al., 
2001). The DAS has demonstrated good construct validity (Alloy et al., 2000; Francis-
Raniere et al., 2006) and in the present study had an internal consistency of α = .80. 
Although retest reliability of extreme responses on the DAS has not been established, 
predictive validity has been established; extreme responses predicted depressive relapse in 
several studies of unipolar depression (Beevers et al., 2003; Forand & DeRubeis, 2014; 
Petersen et al., 2007; Teasdale et al., 2001).
Schedule for Affective Disorders – Change version—(SADS-C; Endicott & 
Spitzer, 1978). The expanded SADS-C (exp-SADS-C) is a semistructured interview that 
inquires about the occurrence, duration, and symptom severity of mood, anxiety, psychotic, 
and substance use disorders. It was expanded by our group (Alloy et al., 2008, 2012) in the 
same ways as the exp-SADS-L (described above). The exp-SADS-C was conducted at 
follow-up assessments to diagnose DSM-IV episodes of major depression and (hypo)mania 
(see also Alloy et al., 2008; 2012; Francis-Raniere et al., 2006). Exp-SADS-C interviewers 
were blind to participants’ Phase I GBI scores as well as their SADS-L diagnoses. Based on 
60 jointly rated LIBS Project interviews, inter-rater reliability for the exp-SADS-C was 
strong (κ = .80; Francis-Raniere et al., 2006). In a validity study, participants identified the 
dates of their symptoms on the exp-SADS-C compared to daily symptom ratings made over 
a four-month interval with greater than 70% accuracy (Alloy et al., 2008).
Beck Depression Inventory—(BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). The BDI is a 
21-item self-report inventory that assesses the presence and severity of cognitive, 
motivational, affective, and somatic symptoms of depression over the past month. The BDI 
has been shown to be valid among student samples (Bumberry et al., 1978; Hammen, 1980). 
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The BDI was administered at the Time 1 visit to assess current symptoms of depression. 
Internal consistency of the BDI was excellent (α = .94). Scores can range from 0-63 
(observed range was 0-50).
The Halberstadt Mania Inventory—(HMI; Alloy et al., 1999; Halberstadt & Abramson, 
2007) is a 28-item self-report measure that assesses current cognitive, motivational, affective 
and somatic symptoms associated with mania/hypomania over the past month. The HMI was 
modeled after the BDI format and is thus administered and scored in a similar manner. In a 
sample of approximately 1,282 undergraduates, the HMI had high internal consistency (α = .
82), adequate convergent validity with mania symptoms on the exp-SADS-C (r = .46; Alloy 
et al., 2008) and on the mania scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(Hathaway & McKinley, 1951; r = .32, p < .001), and discriminant validity (r = –.26, p < .
001 with the depression scale of the MMPI and r = −.12, p < .001 with the BDI; Halberstadt 
& Abramson, 2007). Evidence of the construct validity of the HMI has been provided by 
Alloy et al. (1999). The HMI was administered at the Time 1 visit to assess current 
symptoms of hypomania. Internal consistency of the HMI was good (α = .83). Scores can 
range from 0-84 (observed range was 3-50).
Statistical Analyses
To evaluate Hypothesis 1, that personality disorder characteristics would be associated with 
extreme cognitions more strongly among individuals with BSDs relative to healthy controls, 
we conducted hierarchical linear regressions. In Step 1, we entered Time 1 symptoms of 
depression and hypomania, and either negative cognitive style total score (when predicting 
extreme attributions) or dysfunctional attitudes total score (when predicting extreme 
dysfunctional attitudes), thus providing conservative tests by predicting extreme cognitions 
beyond general cognitive styles. The main effects of BSD status and IPDE were entered in 
Step 2, followed by the interaction term between BSD and IPDE in Step 3. Each extreme 
cognitive measure (extreme pessimistic attributions, extreme optimistic attributions, extreme 
negative dysfunctional attitudes, and extreme positive dysfunctional attitudes) served as an 
outcome variable. Simple slopes tests were conducted for significant interactions by 
evaluating the association between personality disorder characteristics and extreme 
cognitions among individuals with BSDs and among healthy controls (Aiken & West, 
1991). As recommended by Aiken and West, BSD status was dichotomized and coded as 0 
(healthy control) or 1 (BSD). All analyses with the IPDE were conducted first using the total 
score, with post-hoc analyses investigating IPDE subscales for any relationships that were 
significant using the total score. IPDE scores were mean-centered (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Anticipating a small-to-medium effect size with 80% power and six predictors, power 
analyses indicated that a sample of 142 individuals would be needed; thus, our sample size 
was appropriate.
To evaluate Hypothesis 2, that relative to individuals with less extreme cognitions, 
individuals with more extreme cognitions would be more likely to experience the 
prospective onset of episodes of major depression and hypomania, we conducted logistic 
regression analyses. Extreme cognitions were entered as predictors individually in separate 
analyses (after controlling for Time 1 symptoms of depression and hypomania and time in 
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the study). Analyses were then repeated controlling for either negative cognitive style total 
score (in analyses containing extreme attributions) or dysfunctional attitudes total score (in 
analyses containing extreme dysfunctional attitudes), to examine the unique ability of 
extreme cognitions to predict depression and hypomania beyond general cognitive styles. 
Anticipating a small-to-medium effect size with 80% power and five predictors, power 




Before conducting our primary analyses, independent samples t-tests were used to evaluate 
differences between BSD and healthy controls on study variables (Table 1). Relative to 
healthy controls, BSD participants exhibited more overall negative cognitive styles (CSQ 
Total Score) and more extreme pessimistic attributions, but not more extreme optimistic 
attributions. Individuals with BSDs also had higher levels of dysfunctional attitudes overall 
(DAS Total Score), and had fewer extreme optimistic dysfunctional attitudes. BSD 
participants also had higher levels of personality disorder characteristics, more Time 1 
depressive symptoms, and were more likely to experience the onset of episodes of 
hypomania and depression across follow-up. The groups did not differ on Time 1 
hypomanic symptoms, age, gender, or race. Acrossfollow-up, 28 individuals experienced the 
onset of a hypomanic episode, whereas 37 individuals experienced the onset of a major 
depressive episode.
Additionally, extreme pessimistic attributions and extreme optimistic attributions were 
significantly moderately correlated (r = .46, p < .001). The correlation between extreme 
negative dysfunctional attitudes and extreme positive dysfunctional attitudes did not meet 
significance (r = .15, p = .06). Extreme pessimistic attributions and extreme negative 
dysfunctional attitudes were significantly moderately correlated (r = .61, p < .0001).
Hypothesis 1: Are Personality Disorder Characteristics More Strongly Associated with 
Extreme Cognitions Among Individuals with BSDs?
As hypothesized, BSD status interacted with the IPDE total score to predict extreme 
pessimistic attributions (Table 2; Figure 1a), such that there was a significant association 
between personality disorder characteristics and extreme pessimistic attributions among 
individuals with BSDs (t = 3.97, p = .0001), but not among healthy controls (t = −0.92, p = .
36). Post-hoc analyses revealed that this interaction was significant in the same directions 
using the borderline (t = 3.09, p < .01), histrionic (t = 2.41, p = .02), and dependent (t = 2.26, 
p = .03) subscales of the IPDE.
Similarly, BSD status interacted with the IPDE total score to predict extreme optimistic 
attributions (Table 2; Figure 1b), such that there was a significant association between 
personality disorder characteristics and extreme optimistic attributions among individuals 
with BSDs (t = 3.59, p < .001), but not among healthy controls (t = −0.83, p = .41). This 
interaction was significant in the same directions using the borderline (t = 2.33, p = .02) and 
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histrionic (t = 2.47, p = .01) subscales of the IPDE, but not for the dependent subscale (t = 
1.58, p = .12).
BSD status also interacted with the IPDE total score to predict extreme negative 
dysfunctional attitudes (Table 2; Figure 1c), such that there was a significant relationship 
between personality disorder characteristics and extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes 
among individuals with BSDs (t = 2.13, p = .03), but not among healthy controls (t = −1.20, 
p = .23). However, none of the post-hoc analyses of interactions using IPDE subscales were 
significant.
Similarly, BSD status interacted with the IPDE total score to predict extreme positive 
dysfunctional attitudes (Table 2; Figure 1d), such that there was a significant association 
between personality disorder characteristics and extreme positive dysfunctional attitudes 
among individuals with BSDs (t = 2.29, p = .02), but not among healthy controls (t = −1.07, 
p = .29). However, none of the post-hoc analyses of interactions using IPDE subscales were 
significant.
Hypothesis 2: Do Extreme Cognitions Predict the Prospective Onset of Mood Episodes?
The prospective onset of episodes of depression was significantly predicted by extreme 
pessimistic attributions (OR = 1.05, p < .01), and extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes 
(OR = 1.17, p < .01), but not by extreme optimistic attributions (OR = 1.01, p = .44) or 
extreme positive dysfunctional attitudes (OR = 0.97, p = .31). Similarly, the prospective 
onset of episodes of hypomania was significantly predicted by extreme pessimistic 
attributions (OR = 1.06, p < .01), and extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes (OR = 1.11, p 
= .04), but not by extreme optimistic attributions (OR = 0.99, p = .70) or extreme positive 
dysfunctional attitudes (OR = 0.96, p = .25).
Table 3 displays analyses with extreme cognitions predicting episodes of depression and 
hypomania after controlling for general cognitive styles. When accounting for overall 
negative cognitive style, extreme pessimistic attributions continued to significantly predict 
the onset of depression; extreme optimistic attributions predicted the onset of depression at a 
trend level (p = .09). When accounting for overall dysfunctional attitudes, extreme negative 
dysfunctional attitudes predicted the onset of depression at a trend level (p = .06); extreme 
positive dysfunctional attitudes continued not to predict the onset of depression.
When accounting for overall negative cognitive style, extreme pessimistic attributions no 
longer significantly predicted the onset of hypomania; extreme optimistic attributions also 
did not predict the onset of hypomania. Similarly, when accounting for overall dysfunctional 
attitudes, extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes no longer predicted the onset of 
hypomania; extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes continued not to predict the onset of 
hypomania.
Discussion
Our results indicate that extreme cognitive styles are highest among people with BSDs in 
conjunction with personality disorder characteristics. Among individuals with BSDs, 
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personality disorder characteristics predicted more extreme responses on both measures of 
cognitive style (negative cognitive style and dysfunctional attitudes), regardless of the 
valence of the cognitions (optimistic-pessimistic or positive-negative). The importance of 
understanding characteristics associated with extreme cognitions is underscored by the fact 
that extreme negative cognitions also were linked to the future occurrence of episodes of 
depression and hypomania. Our study provides further evidence that extreme negative 
cognitive styles may be maladaptive, and extends this research to individuals with BSDs. 
Given that previous research has linked extreme cognitions to the onset of mood episodes in 
MDD and BD (Beevers et al., 2003; Forand & DeRubeis, 2014; Petersen et al., 2007; Stange 
et al., 2013a,b; Teasdale et al., 2001), results that were partially replicated in the present 
study, these results suggest that one reason that individuals with BSDs and personality 
disorders are vulnerable to experiencing mood episodes may be that these individuals tend to 
exhibit extreme cognitions.
Consistent with prior studies of cognitive style in BDs (see Alloy et al., 2005), individuals 
with BSDs had more negative cognitive styles and more dysfunctional attitudes than did 
healthy controls. However, this study is the first to compare extreme cognitions in 
individuals with BSDs to healthy control participants, and found that extreme pessimistic 
attributions, but not extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes, were higher in individuals 
with BSDs.
Furthermore, it was individuals with the combination of BSD and elevated personality 
disorder characteristics who had the most extreme cognitive styles. Importantly, these 
analyses accounted for individuals’ levels of general negative cognitive styles as typically 
evaluated on the CSQ and DAS, indicating that personality disorder characteristics were 
associated specifically with extreme cognitive styles in BSDs, rather than with negative 
cognitive styles in general. This suggests that personality disorder comorbidity may help to 
explain which individuals with BSDs have extreme cognitions, but that comorbidity is not 
simply associated with more negative cognitions overall. Borderline and histrionic 
characteristics were associated with more extreme pessimistic and more extreme optimistic 
attributions in BSDs, suggesting that these individuals’ cognitive styles may be consistent 
with the extremely dramatic and emotional traits that characterize these disorders (e.g., the 
black-and-white thinking that characterizes borderline personality; e.g., Mak & Lam, 2013). 
In contrast, dependent personality disorder characteristics were associated only with extreme 
pessimistic attributions in BSDs, which may be consistent with these individuals’ tendency 
to have negative self-schemas and therefore to hold extreme maladaptive beliefs about 
competence (Beck et al., 2006). It is possible that the tendency to hold extreme negative 
cognitions may be part of a broader cognitive style of inflexibly responding to the world that 
characterizes personality disorders (e.g., Lenzenweger & Clarkin, 2005).
Unexpectedly, we also found that BSD participants had less extreme positive dysfunctional 
attitudes relative to controls, and that these extreme positive dysfunctional attitudes did not 
predict the onset of mood episodes. Although extreme dysfunctional attitudes have not 
previously been evaluated in BSDs, these results contrast with studies of MDD that found 
that extreme positive dysfunctional attitudes predicted the recurrence of depressive episodes 
(Forand & DeRubeis, 2014; Petersen et al., 2007). Although the reason for the discrepancy 
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between these studies is unclear, it could be that “extreme positive” dysfunctional attitudes 
(as measured by the DAS) generally do not truly indicate the presence of extreme beliefs but 
rather represent a lack of maladaptive beliefs (e.g., Forand & DeRubeis, 2014). In our 
sample, extreme optimistic and extreme pessimistic attributions were moderately correlated, 
whereas extreme positive and extreme negative responses on the DAS were not significantly 
correlated. This suggests that although endpoints of these scales may capture some shared 
component of cognitive extremity or rigidity, they may not represent a unitary construct; our 
data suggest that extreme negative responses may be most maladaptive in BSDs. 
Nevertheless, future research should use additional measures and methods to examine the 
role of extreme positive cognitions in the course of illness in BSDs and personality disorders 
(e.g., Dodd et al., 2011).
Consistent with data from individuals with bipolar I or II disorder from STEP-BD (Stange et 
al., 2013b), individuals who made more extreme negative attributions were more likely to 
experience a prospective onset of an episode of hypomania. In addition, ours is the first 
study to demonstrate that extreme pessimistic attributions are associated with a greater 
likelihood of the onset of a major depressive episode among a sample containing individuals 
with BSDs. Along with results from STEP-BD indicating that extreme attributions predicted 
longer duration of current episodes (Stange et al., 2013a), our results indicate that 
understanding the determinants of extreme negative cognitions may be important because 
they have implications for understanding the course of illness in BSDs.
Our study is also the first to evaluate extreme dysfunctional attitudes in BSDs. Consistent 
with previous studies of unipolar depression that found that extreme dysfunctional attitudes 
predicted depressive relapse (Beevers et al., 2003; Forand & DeRubeis, 2014; Petersen et 
al., 2007; Teasdale et al., 2001), in our sample, extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes 
predicted a greater likelihood of experiencing an onset of major depression. Extreme 
negative dysfunctional attitudes also predicted the onset of episodes of hypomania. Given 
the moderate to strong correlation between extreme pessimistic attributions and extreme 
negative dysfunctional attitudes, these results suggest that extreme negative responding on 
measures of cognitive style in general in BSDs may be indicative of susceptibility to mood 
dysregulation, regardless of the valence of the moods.
Although extreme pessimistic attributions and extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes 
predicted the prospective onset of episodes of depression and hypomania, some of these 
relationships were attenuated when accounting for general cognitive styles. When testing 
extreme pessimistic attributions and general negative cognitive style in models 
simultaneously, only extreme pessimistic attributions predicted the onset of depression, but 
only general negative cognitive style predicted the onset of hypomania. This could suggest 
that the extremity of pessimistic attributions could confer particular vulnerability to 
depression in BSDs, whereas extreme pessimistic attributions are likely to lead to 
hypomania as a result of the general negativity, as opposed to the extremity, of the style. 
However, given that extreme pessimistic attributions (but not general negative cognitive 
style) conferred risk for mania in bipolar I disorder (Stange et al., 2013b), these results will 
need to be replicated before firm conclusions can be drawn. Similarly, when testing extreme 
negative dysfunctional attitudes and general dysfunctional attitudes in models 
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simultaneously, extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes predicted the onset of depression 
only at a trend level, whereas extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes no longer predicted 
the onset of hypomania. Thus, our data provide somewhat less support for extreme 
dysfunctional attitudes in providing additional risk for mood episodes beyond that conferred 
by general dysfunctional attitudes. Still, it is important to note that the majority of previous 
studies that have evaluated the association between extreme cognitions and mood episodes 
have not accounted for general negative cognitive styles in statistical analyses. Given that 
ruling out alternative plausible explanations will be important in determining whether 
extreme cognitions serve as vulnerability factors (e.g., Riskind & Alloy, 2006), our 
controlling for general negative cognitive styles is an important strength of the current study.
This study is an early step in understanding the characteristics associated with people who 
make extreme attributions and/or who hold extreme beliefs. However, we know little about 
what extreme responses on these cognitive measures represent. Previous studies have found 
that extreme response styles on other self-report measures are associated with intolerance of 
ambiguity, cognitive inflexibility, simplistic thinking, and taking a shorter time to complete 
measures (Hamilton, 1968; Naemi, Beale, & Payne, 2009). These findings are consistent 
with the notion that extreme responses on cognitive measures may represent relatively 
automatic schematic processing that is uncorrected by deliberate reappraisal in more 
moderate terms (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Teasdale et al., 2001). They also indicate that extreme 
responses may represent an all-or-nothing, rigid way of responding to the environment.
It is not yet clear precisely why extreme cognitions are associated with the occurrence of 
mood episodes. Stress generation has been proposed as a mechanism by which individuals 
with mood disorders or cognitive vulnerabilities shape their own environments and 
contribute to the occurrence of stressful events (Bender et al., 2010; Hammen, 1991; Safford 
et al, 2007). It is likely that individuals who have extreme cognitions generate distress in 
interpersonal relationships with these cognitions (Hamilton et al., 2013; Safford et al., 
2007); these ensuing stressful events are likely to impact the mood state of the individual 
(e.g., Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Roberts, 1995). Cognitive inflexibility, or the reluctance to 
change beliefs or attitudes or to perseverate in mental acts, is also elevated in bipolar 
disorder and could result in a poorer course of illness as a result of difficulty disengaging 
from negative patterns of thought (e.g., Joormann & Siemer, 2011). It is possible that 
extreme cognitions are associated with cognitive inflexibility, although we did not evaluate 
this proposition in this study. Similarly, endorsing extreme or inflexible cognitions could 
signify an inability to modify coping styles in the face of difficult life events, thereby 
leading to affective changes (Cheng, 2001; Fresco et al., 2007a).
Although preliminary, these results may have implications for the treatment of individuals 
with BSDs. First, modifying extreme negative cognitions might be helpful in improving the 
course of BSDs. In line with this suggestion, changes to extreme dysfunctional attitudes 
have been shown to mediate progress in cognitive therapy for unipolar depression (Petersen 
et al., 2007; Teasdale et al., 2001). Thus, patients with BSDs may benefit from therapies that 
focus on restructuring of extreme thoughts and beliefs, and that facilitate achieving cognitive 
distance so as to reduce the impact of extreme cognitions. It is possible that patients who 
have extreme cognitions could also benefit from treatments involving mindful detachment 
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from and observing of thoughts rather than assuming their accuracy (e.g., Deckersbach et 
al., 2012; Fresco et al., 2007b). These targets of treatment may prove especially helpful 
among individuals with BSDs who also exhibit personality disorder characteristics, as these 
individuals may be the most likely to have these extreme cognitions and to experience more 
frequent and/or more severe mood episodes.
It is important to note that we did not diagnose personality disorders in this sample, but 
rather used a continuous measure of these characteristics, so the implications for more 
severe, diagnosable personality disorders are unclear. It is possible that using a continuous 
sum score of personality disorder characteristics across multiple types of personality 
pathology made it difficult to differentiate between individuals with a personality disorder in 
one domain but few symptoms in another, from individuals with no identifiable personality 
disorder but who possess a profile of symptoms in each of several personality disorder areas. 
In addition, we evaluated personality disorder characteristics but did not utilize a 
comparison group of BSD participants with non-personality disorder comorbid 
psychopathology, so it is unclear to what extent these results may be specific to BSD and 
personality disorder comorbidity versus to comorbidity in general. Similarly, our sample 
includes individuals on the bipolar spectrum so it is unclear whether these results also apply 
for individuals with bipolar I disorder. Several factors may have led us to underestimate 
associations between extreme optimistic or positive cognitions and the onset of mood 
episodes, including excluding individuals with bipolar I, not conducting prospective 
analyses in the BSD group exclusively, left- and right-censoring and relatively low base-rate 
of mood episodes, not examining bipolar subgroups (i.e., bipolar II, bipolar NOS, and 
cyclothymia) separately, not evaluating associations with specific treatments such as 
exposure to cognitive therapy, and using self-reported measures of cognitive styles. 
Complimentary future studies might follow individuals more intensively and use event 
history models to predict progression or relapse of mood episodes.
Next, it is also important to acknowledge that several of our measures (e.g., personality 
disorder characteristics and cognitive styles) were evaluated at the same time point, which 
prevented us from evaluating potential mediational relationships between the variables 
tested. The study also may have been limited by relatively low inter-rater reliabilities on the 
IPDE, and by calculating reliability based on re-ratings of original interviews rather than by 
independently-administered interviews. Next, more work demonstrating the construct 
validity and psychometric properties (e.g., retest reliability) of measures of cognitive 
extremity as assessed by the DAS and CSQ also is needed. Finally, it is unclear whether 
extreme cognitions reported on questionnaires accurately reflect how people actually think 
in response to stressors. Future research evaluating extreme attributions should include 
event-specific inferences for actual events that happened in participants’ lives.
In sum, the present study indicates that personality disorder characteristics may exacerbate 
the tendency for individuals with BSDs to have extreme cognitions, and it corroborates 
evidence for the utility of evaluating extreme cognitions in understanding the course of 
mood disorders. Future research should examine what extreme cognitive responses on self-
report measures represent in real life, and should examine mechanisms underlying these 
relationships among clinical samples of individuals with BSDs and comorbid personality 
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disorders. Although this study is one of the first to examine correlates of extreme cognitions, 
it suggests that when it comes to cognition, the “middle path” may be most adaptive.
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Interactions between bipolar spectrum disorder (BSD) status and personality disorder 
characteristics predicting (a) extreme pessimistic attributions, (b) extreme optimistic 
attributions, (c) extreme negative dysfunctional attitudes, and (d) extreme positive 
dysfunctional attitudes.
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics for the Study Sample
BSD (n = 83) Healthy Controls (n = 89) Group Difference (χ2 or t)
Gender 61.25% 67.44% 0.69
Age 19.56 (1.77) 20.04 (1.98) −1.68
Race 2.52
    Caucasian 51.25% 55.81%
    African-American 30.00% 22.09%
    Hispanic 3.75% 3.49%
    Asian 3.75% 8.14%
    Other 11.25% 10.47%
BDI 11.42 (10.17) 2.71 (3.31)
7.35
***
HMI 15.03 (9.48) 13.23 (7.43) 1.38
CSQ Extreme Pessimistic 15.51 (12.48) 10.90 (9.09)
2.72
**
CSQ Extreme Optimistic 22.48 (16.12) 23.51 (15.72) −0.42
CSQ Total Score −.89 (1.43) −1.84 (.88)
4.84
***
DAS Extreme Negative 2.75 (4.23) 1.79 (2.39) 1.79
DAS Extreme Positive 7.51 (7.10) 11.18 (8.71)
−2.99
**
DAS Total Score 136.91 (36.01) 110.18 (28.72)
5.03
***
IPDE Sum Score 11.98 (9.04) 3.32 (5.12)
7.57
***
Hypomanic Episode (Prospective) 32.10% 2.30%
26.82
***
Major Depressive Episode (Prospective) 41.98% 3.45%
36.26
***
* p < .05
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; HMI = Halberstadt Mania Inventory; CSQ = Cognitive Style Questionnaire; DAS = Dysfunctional 
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Table 2
Interactions between Bipolar Spectrum Disorder Status and Personality Disorder Characteristics Predicting 
Extreme Attributional Styles and Dysfunctional Attitudes.
Extreme Pessimistic Attributions Extreme Optimistic Attributions
Step Variable β t ΔR2 Variable β t ΔR2
1 BDI −.01 −0.09
.22
*** BDI .09 1.26
.24
***
HMI .05 0.63 HMI .03 0.47
CSQ Total .47
6.02
*** CSQ Total −.51
−6.58
***
2 BDI −.04 −0.49
.04
* BDI .01 0.13
.04
*
HMI .04 0.51 HMI .01 −.10
CSQ Total .45
5.66
*** CSQ Total −.55
−7.07
***






3 BDI −.07 −0.78
.04
** BDI −.01 −0.13
.03
**
HMI .03 0.43 HMI <.01 0.01
CSQ Total .44
5.69
*** CSQ Total −.56
−7.27
***
BSD −.02 −0.22 BSD .11 1.13
IPDE −.15 −0.92 IPDE −.13 −0.83
BSD × IPDE .42
2.79
** BSD × IPDE .37
2.52
*
Extreme Negative Dysfunctional Attitudes Extreme Positive Dysfunctional Attitudes
Step Variable β t ΔR2 Variable β t ΔR2
1 BDI .06 0.75
.09
** BDI .10 1.66
.52
***
HMI .03 0.42 HMI .01 0.25
DAS Total .27
3.19
** DAS Total −.75
−12.22
***
2 BDI .04 0.39 .01 BDI .11 1.52 .01
HMI .03 0.43 HMI .02 0.34
DAS Total .25
2.92
** DAS Total −.75
−11.80
***
BSD −.02 −0.21 BSD −.08 −1.08
IPDE .10 1.12 IPDE .09 1.33
3 BDI .01 0.15
.03
* BDI .09 1.29
.02
*
HMI .03 0.46 HMI .02 0.37
DAS Total .25
2.93
** DAS Total −.75
−11.98
***
BSD .04 0.34 BSD −.04 −0.51
IPDE −.20 −1.20 IPDE −.13 1.07
BSD × IPDE .34
2.17
* BSD × IPDE .24
2.15
*
Note: BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; HMI = Halberstadt Mania Inventory; CSQ = Cognitive Style Questionnaire; BSD = bipolar spectrum 
disorder diagnosis; IPDE = International Personality Disorder Examination sum score; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitude Scale.
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Table 3
Extreme Cognitions Predicting the Prospective Onset of Episodes of Depression and Hypomania, after 
Accounting for General Cognitive Styles.
Predicting Depression Predicting Hypomania




† 1.00-1.09 .14 1.27 1.03 0.98-1.08 .36
HMI 0.03 1.00 0.95-1.05 0.83 0.97 0.91-1.04










* 1.00-1.10 .04 1.53 1.03 0.98-1.09 .01
HMI 0.07 0.99 0.94-1.05 0.93 0.97 0.91-1.03
Time in Study 0.48 1.00 1.00-1.00 7.90
1.00
** 1.00-1.00
CSQ Total 0.49 1.16 0.77-1.74 6.98
2.11
** 1.21-3.66
Extreme Pessimistic (CSQ) 4.22
1.05




† 1.00-1.09 .14 1.27 1.03 0.98-1.08 .36
HMI 0.03 1.00 0.95-1.05 0.83 0.97 0.91-1.04










† 1.00-1.09 .03 1.18 1.03 0.98-1.08 .02
HMI 0.07 0.99 0.94-1.05 0.96 0.97 0.91-1.03








Extreme Optimistic (CSQ) 2.80
1.03
† 1.00-1.06 2.17 1.03 0.99-1.07
Extreme Negative Dysfunctional Attitudes
1 BDI 4.80
1.06
* 1.01-1.11 .17 5.98 1.07 1,01-1.13 .23
HMI 0.02 1.00 0.95-1.06 0.99 0.96 0.90-1.04
Time in Study 1.60 1.00 1.00-1.00 6.60 1.00 1.00-1.00
DAS Total 5.57
1.01
* 1.00-1.03 2.19 1.01 1.00-1.02
2 BDI 4.42
1.06
* 1.00-1.11 .03 5.85
1.07
* 1.01-1.13 <.01
HMI 0.01 1.00 0.95-1.06 0.98 0.96 0.90-1.04





† 1.00-1.02 1.40 1.01 0.99-1.02
Extreme Negative (DAS) 3.50
1.15
† 0.99-1.34 0.31 1.04 0.90-1.21
Extreme Positive Dysfunctional Attitudes
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Predicting Depression Predicting Hypomania
Step Variable Wald OR 95% CI ΔR2 Wald OR 95% CI ΔR2
1 BDI 4.80
1.06
* 1.01-1.11 .17 5.98 1.07 1.01-1.13 .23
HMI 0.02 1.00 0.95-1.06 0.99 0.96 0.90-1.04
Time in Study 1.60 1.00 1.00-1.00 6.60 1.00 1.00-1.00
DAS Total 5.57
1.01
* 1.00-1.03 2.19 1.01 1.00-1.02
2 BDI 4.40
1.06
* 1.00-1.11 .01 5.95 1.07 1.01-1.13 <.01
HMI 0.03 1.00 0.95-1.06 1.00 0.96 0.90-1.04
Time in Study 1.74 1.00 1.00-1.00 6.56 1.00 1.00-1.00
DAS Total 5.46
1.02
* 1.00-1.04 1.00 1.01 0.99-1.02
Extreme Positive (DAS) 0.91 1.04 0.96-1.12 0.01 1.00 0.91-1.09
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